For the customer: vulnerable firewalls of Juniper’s ScreenOS system

23 Dec 2015 | Author: | No comments yet »

“Backdoor” computer hack may have put government data at risk.

The flaw was discovered Thursday in software called ScreenOS, from Juniper Networks, which enables VPN (virtual private network) connections used by many businesses and agencies for secure access to their networks. Encryption backdoors have been a hot topic in the last few years—and the controversial issue got even hotter after the terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, when it dominated media headlines.Juniper, a major manufacturer of networking equipment, said on Thursday it found spying code planted in certain models of its firewalls, an alarming discovery that echoes of state-sponsored tampering.

In a security bulletin posted on Juniper’s website, it warned that the flaw “allows unauthorized remote administrative access to the device over SSH or telnet. A senior U.S. official who declined to be named because of the sensitivity of the matter said the Department of Homeland Security is working with Juniper as it investigates the issue. The affected products are those running ScreenOS, one of Juniper’s operating systems that runs on a range of appliances that act as firewalls and enable VPNs. The official said the White House National Security Council had taken an interest in Juniper’s rare disclosure that somebody had inserted rogue code into its software.

Once we identified these vulnerabilities, we launched an investigation into the matter, and worked to develop and issue patched releases for the latest versions of ScreenOS.” According to the tech site Engadget, the “backdoor” which could have given unauthorized users access to Juniper’s software had been present since 2012. CBS News Justice and Homeland Security Correspondent Jeff Pegues reports government investigators have been in contact with Juniper to see if government computers were potentially affected. He did not indicate where Juniper thinks the code originated. “At this time, we have not received any reports of these vulnerabilities being exploited; however, we strongly recommend that customers update their systems and apply the patched releases with the highest priority,” Worrell wrote. Juniper warned customers on Thursday that it had uncovered “unauthorized code” in the software that runs its firewalls, saying it could be exploited to allow an attacker to unscramble encrypted communications.

Although log files would reflect a login attempt, “a skilled attacker would likely remove these entries from the log file, thus effectively eliminating any reliable signature that the device had been compromised,” Juniper wrote. A former Juniper security executive said the flaw appeared to be a “back door,” a reference to rogue code secretly inserted into a product to enable attackers to eavesdrop on users. “This shines a light on the fact that kind of attack is something intelligence agencies are probably doing,” said Chris Wysopal, chief technology officer with Veracode, a maker of software for uncovering coding bugs. Cybersecurity expert Michael DeCesare, CEO of ForeScout Technologies, said Juniper will need to determine whether it was an inside or outside job. “It will take time for their IT department to really understand how the attack occurred,” DeCesare told CBS News in an email. “What’s so troubling about this breach is that the very software that you trust to keep you safe becomes the vehicle into your organization for the attackers. By reverse-engineering the firmware on a Juniper firewall, analysts at his company found the password in just six hours. “Once you know there is a backdoor there, … the patch [Juniper released] gives away where to look for [the backdoor] … which you can use to log into every [Juniper] device using the Screen OS software,” he told WIRED. “We are now capable of logging into all vulnerable firewalls in the same way as the actors [who installed the backdoor].” But there is another concern raised by Juniper’s announcement and patches—any other nation-state attackers, in addition to the culprits who installed the backdoors, who have intercepted and stored encrypted VPN traffic running through Juniper’s firewalls in the past, may now be able to decrypt it, Prins says, by analyzing Juniper’s patches and figuring out how the initial attackers were using the backdoor to decrypt it. “If other state actors are intercepting VPN traffic from those VPN devices, … they will be able to go back in history and be able to decrypt this kind of traffic,” he says. Weaver says this depends on the exact nature of the VPN backdoor. “If it was something like the Dual EC, the backdoor doesn’t actually get you in, … you also need to know the secret.

The compromise of such a prominent vendor with code specifically designed for spying echoes operations by the NSA described in documents leaked in 2013 by former contractor Edward Snowden. If Juniper did use Dual EC, an algorithm long-known to be vulnerable, and this is part of the backdoor in question, it underscores that threat of repurposing by other actors even more. The company said it discovered the backdoors during an internal code review, but it didn’t say if this was a routine review or if it had examined the code specifically after receiving a tip that something suspicious was in it.

Speculation in the security community about who might have installed the unauthorized code centers on the NSA, though it could have been another nation-state actor with similar capabilities, such as the UK, China, Russia, or even Israel. An NSA spy tool catalogue leaked to Der Spiegel in 2013 described a sophisticated NSA implant known as FEEDTROUGH that was designed to maintain a persistent backdoor in Juniper firewalls. FEEDTROUGH, Der Spiegel wrote, “burrows into Juniper firewalls and makes it possible to smuggle other NSA programs into mainframe computers…..” It’s also designed to remain on systems even after they’re rebooted or the operating system on them is upgraded. FEEDTROUGH is a firmware implant—a kind of “aftermarket” spy tool installed on specific targeted devices in the field or before they’re delivered to customers.

Naturally, some in the community have questioned whether these were backdoors that Juniper had voluntarily installed for a specific government and decided to disclose only after it became apparent that the backdoor had been discovered by others.

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